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"I'm Just Some Guy": Positing and
Leveraging Legal Subjects in Consumer
Contracts and the Global Market
TAL KASTNER*
ABSTRACT
This article considers how legal frameworks shape the autonomous
subject in a global economy. It makes salient the ways that different legal
frameworks presume and enforce a particular subjectivity by positing
certain behavioral expectations of various subjects. It does so through a
focus on the underexplored rhetoric and implicit narratives of consumer
contract law and transactional practice in the American and European
regimes. By comparing the approach of the European Union to consumer
contract, which posits the consumer as facing significant constraints on
agency, to that in the United States, which elides functional limits of
consumer knowledge and choice, this article highlights the dynamics of
power implicit in how regional legal systems variously recognize parties'
behavioral expectations or subjectivity. The article also demonstrates
how the positing of subjectivity informs an individual's subjective
experience and shapes the corporate subject in a global context. Through
two case studies of the role of ancillary terms in American consumer
contracts, the article shows how the legal framework enables more
powerful actors to leverage the very narrative of agency and rhetoric of
agreement as well as the consumer's posited subjectivity to manipulate a
consumer's actual subjective experience and hinder choice and agency.
Juxtaposing the American and European consumer as subjects, this
article highlights the ways in which hierarchies of subjects may be
created and, at the very least, how competing subjectivities come to the
fore in the global market through contract law.
* Postdoctoral Fellow of Law and Interdisciplinary Studies, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Princeton University. I am grateful to all the
conveners of and participants in the Law in the Lighthouse conference, and in particular
for input from Tara Helfman, Chantal Nadeau, Jaakko Salminen, Jakob Schemmel, Susan
Sterett, and Mika Viljanen.
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INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CONTRACT REGIMES
Freedom and autonomy figure centrally, at least conceptually and
rhetorically, in various aspects of legal regimes around the globe. This
article seeks to highlight the sometimes subtle ways in which
frameworks of law enable definitions of autonomy and frame the
autonomous subject.' By placing behavioral expectations on individuals
and other legal entities-that is, by presuming and enforcing a
particular subjectivity-legal frameworks both posit and shape their
subjects. Elucidating this process in the area of consumer contract law,
this article calls attention to the substance of freedom as a regional and
global phenomenon. It highlights the relation of freedom to dynamics of
power, in what can be understood as the current post-neoliberal age.2
Legal frameworks in the United States and Europe, like others,
build on a presumption of agency, thereby necessarily engaging a
subject's will and thus the experienced perspective and resulting
behavioral expectations-or the subjectivity-of the legal actor. By
positing certain acts as free, or by recognizing particular subjectivities,
the legal framework engages in defining the parameters of agency of the
legal subject and the substance of liberty. In doing so, it necessarily
1. See generally Susan S. Silbey & Ayn Cavicchi, The Common Place of Law
Transforming Matters of Concern into the Objects of Everyday Life, in MAKING THINGS
PUBLIc: ATMOSPHERES OF DEMOCRACY 556, 558-59 (Bruno Latour & Peter Weibel, eds.,
2005) (examining an automobile and calling attention to how legal requirements (for
example, title) transform the structure of the machine). Others in this symposium have
followed this insight to examine the relation of the law to the subjectivity of entities such
as banks or corporations. See, for example, Mika Viljanen, Making Banks on a Global
Scale: Management Based Regulation as Agencement, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
425-53 (2016); Jaakko Salminen, Contract Boundary Spanning Governance Mechanisms:
Conceptualizing Fragmented and Globalized Production as Collectively Governed Entities,
23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 709-42 (2016), for articles that have followed this insight
to examine the relation of the law to the subjectivity of entities such as banks or
corporations. For more on the ways in which human subjectivity is recognized, shaped,
and leveraged through processes of law and language, see, for example, Susan Sterett,
Documentation and Emotions: Producing Displaced Legal Subjects, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 567-601 (2016).
2. See generally Carol J. Greenhouse, Introduction, in ETHNOGRAPHIES OF
NEOLIBERALISM 1 (Carol J. Greenhouse, ed., 2010) (defining neoliberalism as "the
prevailing approach (for now) to government that supplants regulation by law with
market forces "). See also Nicolfs M. Perrone, The International Investment Regime After
the Global Crisis of Neoliberalism: Rupture or Continuity?, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
603-27 (2016) (identifying the continuity between the periods rather than engaging the
current era from a post-neoliberal perspective). In addition, as the discussion below
suggests, the extent to which regulation is, or can be, understood as independent of
market forces is informed in part by cultural norms and social structures, which are
themselves in play with each other in a globalized environment.
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allocates power among so-called privately transacting parties. Often,
limits on the subject, including any constraints on a legal actor's
subjective experience or on the recognition of the potential of this
experience to shape behavior, are implicit and thus naturalized in the
legal structure. Through an examination of narratives of agency and
rhetoric of agreement in consumer contract law in the United States,
viewed against the backdrop of the European Union (EU) approach to
harmonizing visions of the subjects of individual Member States and the
European Community, this article calls attention to these limits, along
with some of the particular dynamics of subjectivity that inform
experiences and notions of freedom. I will examine the phenomenon of
competing subjectivities that may be recognized in the law, focusing on
the treatment of ancillary terms in consumer contracts. I juxtapose the
EU framework, in which individuals' agency in consumer transactions is
imagined to be attenuated if not impossible, to that in the United
States, in which agency is presumed. Using a lens of competing
subjectivities, this article highlights the dynamics of power implicit in
how regional legal systems variously recognize parties' subjectivity and
continue to inform subjective experience in a global context. In
identifying distinct visions of the consumer subject, I also point to the
development of particular corporate subjectivities in relation to the
individual subject being framed by the law.
As I take up in detail below, certain subjectivities, or experiences
and resulting behaviors, are necessarily given preference or validated
over others in any legal regime in the process of contracting. In the
United States, as distinct from the European approach, existing
statutes and case law enable some parties to leverage the power of what
I suggest is a particularly American cultural narrative of agreement.
This framework thereby reinforces the ability of more powerful parties
to generate signs of agreement under the law and perhaps even shape
an experience of (seeming) agreement on the part of the consumer, the
substance of which can be undone by these very signs. Positing a
particular consumer subject with particular behavioral expectations, the
legal framework not only facilitates the leveraging of power by
businesses, but also encourages the internalization by the corporate
subject of these potentially exploitative practices. In this way, the
approach to consumer contracting in the United States imagines a
preternaturally competent and unconstrained individual, and thus
erases the constraint that results from his or her predictable deviance
from the posited subjectivity. At the same time, the practices posited as
fair and acceptable by law further the development of an exploitative
533
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corporate subject.3
I turn, in the discussion that follows, to case studies of how this can
happen. I explore how the dynamics at work in these examples are
informed by the specific American context and thereby contribute to
constituting a particular American subject-which they do by
implementing an American notion of freedom and autonomy. More
generally, I aim to bring to light one underexplored facet of the role of
subjectivity in the law and of the impact of the law on subjectivity. To do
so, I first discuss briefly the relation between the framing of liberty and
the bounds of the subject in the European context, focusing on
presumptions in the legal framework about the prerequisite context for
(and its impact on) the exercise of contractual will. Specifically, I
examine the framing of context in connection with nonnegotiated
ancillary provisions-or so-called adhesive contract terms pertaining to
secondary aspects of the deal (typically terms other than product,
quality, and price).4 I look at the treatment of the consumer by the
European Community's Council Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts5 to highlight the legal construction of a baseline of
values and experience against which the legal framework posits
consumer subjectivity (and in doing so also shapes corporate
subjectivity). The European approach provides an alternative model of
how the subject is implicated, making salient the presumptions that
undergird a narrative of agency in the United States. As such, I call
attention to the way in which agency and vehicles of freedom are legally
and socially constructed in relation to, but not necessarily in sync with,
3. I thank Mika Viljanen for calling my attention to this point.
4. Considering such take-it-or-leave-it arrangements in which terms are dictated by a
stronger party and the consequences of which are at best vaguely understood by the
weaker actor, I draw on Friedrich Kessler's formulation from the early twentieth century.
See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943). Kessler discussed the emergence, advantages, and
power dynamic around contracts of adhesion in the United States. Id. Steven Burton and
Eric Andersen distinguish between "performance terms," or terms that serve to define the
principal benefits the parties intended to enjoy from the contract ('what they 'really
wanted")-typically, product and price-and "enforcement terms," which incentivize
performance or stipulate terms governing non-performance. Steven J. Burton & Eric G.
Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75 IOWA L. REV. 861, 873-75 (1990). They urge courts
to consider the fact that "[e]nforcement is in the service of, and therefore secondary to,
performance" before imposing these terms on parties. Id. at 874 n.52, 875. I draw as well
on David Horton's analysis of "contract procedure" and identification of "procedural
terms"--"predispute agreements modifying the rules of litigation"-such as forum
selection and arbitration provisions. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract
Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 607-08 (2010).
5. Council Directive 93/13, on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95)
29 (EC) [hereinafter The Directive].
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an individual's potential or experienced subjectivity. In addition, I
underscore how this process can itself also shape individual and
corporate subjectivity. I then return to the construction of subjective
experience through a narrative of agency empowered in the United
States by the legal framework. Ultimately, by comparing American and
European consumers as subjects, I demonstrate how hierarchies of
subjects may be created through rhetoric and presumptions of freedom
and how competing subjectivities come to the fore in the global market
through contract law.
I. THE EU APPROACH TO ANCILLARY CONSUMER CONTRACT TERMS: ONE
VIEW OF LIBERTY (OR ITS IMPOSSIBILITY) AND FINE PRINT
I turn now to the status of ancillary consumer contract provisions in
the European context, focusing on arbitration terms as a particularly
significant example of the ways freedom could potentially be framed in
light of the European Community's Council Directive 93/13 on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts (the Directive). I highlight how the
question of the validity of arbitration terms in European Community
Member States implicates the nature of both an individual and a
corporate legal subject, as well as notions of liberty and agency.
Contractual terms-purported private transactions and thus
manifestations of agency-themselves suggest and reinforce the
existence of an autonomous subject, enabled by the market. Arbitration
terms, in particular, underscore the possibilities of contract as a vehicle
for agency that could allow parties to exercise their wills to establish a
dispute resolution process beyond the traditional structures of the
state.6 Yet arbitration terms-and others that limit a "consumer's right
to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy"
7-are included
among the Directive's indicative list of "unfair" terms: nonnegotiated
6. See generally Maud Piers, Consumer Arbitration in the EU: A Forced Marriage with
Incompatible Expectations, 2 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 209, 209-10 (2011)
(characterizing arbitration as "impl[ying] a degree of autonomy from 'ordinary' state court
proceedings and thereby operat[ing] with a degree of independence from the legal order");
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE
OF LAW 4-9 (2012) (commenting on how independence from the legal order and the
protection it presumably entails is precisely what worries those who identify a structural
discrepancy in bargaining power).
7. The Directive, supra note 5, at Annex §§ 1(j), (k), (q) (including in its list of unfair
terms, among others, terms that limit a "consumer's right to take legal action or exercise
any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions," as well as terms that enable
unilateral modification by the seller either of terms of the contract without a contractually
specified valid reason, or of characteristics of the product or service without valid reason).
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terms imposed by the seller or supplier on the consumer (other than
terms relating to price-to-quality ratio or the actual product or service)
that cause "a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer."8
The Directive recognizes the efficient functioning of the market as a
fundamental goal, seeking to correct for the possibility of "distortions of
competition" resulting from disparities in consumer contract law among
Member States.9 As such, the Directive reflects the ordoliberal origins of
the European Union: a belief in the need for state intervention to enable
functioning markets and thus free competition.'0 The Directive seeks to
"facilitate the establishment of the [European Community] internal
market" and help "sellers in their task of selling goods and supplying
services.. . throughout the [European Community] internal market." In
addition, it invokes the European Community's establishment of
Member States' "responsibility to ensure that contracts concluded with
consumers do not contain unfair terms.""1 Principles of fairness are thus
viewed as instruments of a functioning market, which includes "choice
for Community citizens as consumers."12 Explicitly recognizing the
likelihood of "the abuse of power by the seller or supplier, in particular
against one-sided standard contracts and the unfair exclusion of
essential rights in contracts,"13 the Directive requires Member States to
invalidate such "unfair" terms under national law.' 4  Including
predispute arbitration provisions among other presumptively unfair
terms, the legal regime of the European Community posits a consumer
subject vulnerable to structures of power in the market.'5
8. Id. at art. 3(1).
9. Id.
10. See generally Alessandro Somma, Private Law as Biopolitics: Ordoliberalism,
Social Market Economy, and the Public Dimension of Contract, 76 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 105, 105 (2013) ("This is the point of reference for understanding the public
dimension of contract law consistent with ordoliberalism, in which citizenship is
reinterpreted through market categories: in particular those stressing that producers and
consumers hold delegated economic police functions and have to react automatically to
market stimuli.... That's why EU law is mainly concerned with the prevention of market
failures-that is, with the imposition of the correct functioning of free competition.").
11. The Directive, supra note 5, at 29.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 30.
14. Id. at art. 6(1).
15. I position the EU approach in contrast to that of the United States, which, as
discussed below, validates an imagined consumer subjectivity at odds with the consumer's
likely experience, thereby enabling more powerful actors, typically corporate entities. At
the same time, I do not mean to view uncritically the European approach, which could be
understood as manifesting a colonial outlook. Indeed, as I suggest, it might be seen as
excluding the possibility of consumer agency by rendering a consumer's experiences or
actions irrelevant through the protections it offers. In addition, as the discussion below
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Behavioral research suggests that procedural consumer contract
terms, and similar ancillary ones, pose myriad challenges to consumers'
functional agency as individuals. Most obviously, sellers, as the drafting
party, possess an informational advantage about the significance or
substantive stakes of ancillary terms. Ancillary terms such as
arbitration, forum selection, or unilateral modification provisions can
significantly impact an individual's opportunity for redress.16 In
addition, the "boundedly rational"17 nature of human cognition, and thus
the limits of the framework that enables and colors subjectivity, further
compromises individuals' ability to make choices to their benefit when
faced with such terms. ' In contrast to the seller's institutional
knowledge of risk and benefit, individuals are hampered by the
cognitive difficulties in assessing and weighing risk, especially with
respect to such potentially high-stakes, low-salience terms. 19 Faced with
a large number of terms, individuals typically calculate risk and
probability inaccurately, and fail to correctly weigh and assess the
implications of these provisions.20 As a result, individuals tend not to
make choices in line with their preferences.21 Moreover, even if a
consumer understood the import of a term, the imposition of a trade-off
between monetary value and the limitation of certain rights, for
suggests, this approach potentially involves a different form of leveraging power to posit
subjectivities. Thanks to Chantal Nadeau for pushing me on this point.
16. See generally RADIN, supra note 6, at 5-8, 33-34 ("[A] firm's mass-market
boilerplate withdraws a number of important rights-such as rights of redress granted by
the state, or user rights that are free of owner control under intellectual property regimes
. .. ); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (indicating the potential implications of enforcement terms by outlining how a
contractual restriction on class actions precludes the pursuit of meritorious claims).
17. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2003).
18. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 258 (1995); Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1225-27.
19. See RADIN, supra note 6, at 24-27; Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1217, 1225, 1230-
31.
20. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate: Confronting Normative and
Democratic Degradation, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 617, 625 n.39, 654-55 (2012) ("As
psychological research has shown, we are not able to make an accurate assessment of the
risks. . . . In other words, this could be a classic case of heuristic bias or bounded
rationality. Recipients do not know what their risks are and do not think they need to
know, until it is too late."); RADIN, supra note 6, at 26-27 ("We are not good at assessing
risk; we tend to stay with the status quo; and we make choices according to particular
surrounding circumstances that are salient to us, ignoring others that may be more
pertinent.").
21. See Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1229.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:2
example, not only raises questions of policy,22 but places further stress
on the process of human deliberation. When individuals are confronted
with seemingly untenable choices, they tend to direct their focus
elsewhere.23 Ancillary terms by their nature can thereby impact
individual subjectivity in particularly complex ways, at an individual's
expense, even if he or she were to read them-a practice widely
recognized as unlikely in the current environment.24
In pursuing its "fundamental objective" of offering "freedom,
security and justice without internal borders,"25 the EU framework
takes into account certain dynamics of power as they impact the
individual subject in the context of consumer contracts. Staking
consumer protection as one of its main objectives,26 this legal approach
implicitly incorporates an acknowledgment of the value of experienced
agency, or at least the potentially vulnerable subject, into its notions of
freedom and the market. Thus, for example, the EU Commission
Recommendation 98/257, establishing quality standards for alternative
dispute resolution procedures, identifies fundamental principles
22. As Radin suggests, some rights, such as the right to recourse for harm and access
to a court of law, ought to be treated as noncommodifiable. RADIN, supra note 6, at 106.
This approach to rights and freedom is also implicit in the European approach.
23. Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1230-32.
24. Legal scholars and even courts in the United States acknowledge the likelihood
that ancillary terms are not read. See Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of
Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection
211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 237 (2007) ("The fact that consumers do not read standard
form contracts is so well accepted and documented as to be virtually enshrined as dogma
within the contracts literature."). See Larry Magid, It Pays to Read License Agreements,
PC PITSTOP, http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheckleula.asp (last visited February 4, 2016),
for why reading fine print might not only be unusual-as demonstrated by a $1000 prize
buried in an end-use license agreement hat was not discovered for four months-but also
impractical and unreasonable. See also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The
Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 671, 705 ("Since these pages of
legalese average over 2000 words, since people can read fewer than 150 words in that
time, and since boilerplate is notoriously complex, readership is effectively zero."); Shmuel
I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge that Is Yet to Be
Met, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 723, 773 (2008) ("From a law and economics perspective, [standard
form contracts] create a possible market failure in the form of obligational asymmetric
information."); Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention
to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014) (producing empirical evidence
calling into question informed minority hypothesis).
25. Piers, supra note 6, at 212 n.8 (citing Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 2, Dec. 13,
2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1).
26. See generally id. at 214 n.25 (citing Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union art. 169, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47).
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required of an acceptable alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
27
Among other goals, the Recommendation promotes the "principle of
liberty" through a focus on fairness, requiring express agreement by a
consumer "in full awareness of the facts and only after the dispute has
materialized" to an alternative mechanism of dispute resolution.
28 In
doing so, the Recommendation implicitly aims to shape perceptions of
the practice and validity of arbitration in Member States.29 Specifically,
this approach offers a view of limitations on an ex-ante commitment to
arbitration as a facilitation of, rather than an impingement on,
individual choice and freedom, which in turn might frame individuals'
conceptions of arbitration as a vehicle of agency or constraint.
The EU approach not only recognizes consumer subjectivity in a
particular context of power but also goes further, establishing a
European, rather than a national, subjectivity as the baseline for
imagining a consumer of a Member State.30 The interpretation of the
Directive by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in two significant
cases on arbitration underscores this position. As the ECJ held in the
cases of Mostaza Claro v. Centro M6vil Milenium SL31 and Asturcom v.
Rodriguez Nogueira,32 Member States' national courts must consider the
fairness of an arbitration agreement independently of whether the
consumer raised the claim earlier in the arbitration proceeding or
otherwise.33 This approach thereby extended the vision of justice and
liberty into public policy,34 with the ECJ opting not to engage the due
process question of whether the consumer's fundamental right to a fair
trial had been violated.35 As such, the EU legal regime, informed by the
27. See id. at 215 (citing Commission Recommendation 98/257, art. 6, 1998 O.J. (L 115)
31 (EC) [hereinafter Commission Recommendation 98/257]).
28. Id. at 215 (citing Commission Recommendation 98/257, supra note 27, at art. 6
21).
29. See id. at 215.
30. This raises the questions of whether the European approach is a process of
colonizing subjectivity and of what the implications of this possibility are. Thanks to
Chantal Nadeau for articulating this point.
31. Case C-168/05, Mostaza Claro v. Centro M6vil Milenium SL, 2006 E.C.R. 110437.
32. See Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodriguez
Nogueira, 2009 E.C.R. 1-09579.
33. See Piers, supra note 6, at 222.
34. Id. at 233 n.49 (citing Asturcom, 2009 E.C.R. 1-09579 52).
35. In the case of Mostaza Claro, for example, a consumer, failing to comply with the
terms of her telephone-service contract, was given a ten-day window to reject arbitration
but did not do so. She presented evidence at the arbitration and later appealed the award
to the national annulment judge, citing the Directive and the unfairness of the arbitration
provision. See Piers, supra note 6, at 217. Some scholars suggest the ECJ here missed an
opportunity to engage the due process laws of Member States, id. at 225, noting that these
legal regimes do not ordinarily set aside arbitral awards or invalidate agreements in the
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ECJ's approach,36 preempts a court's consideration of the consumer's
claims-or lack thereof-in the context of a specific national due process
framework.37 This approach thereby recognizes the consumer in terms
of a posited EU subjectivity first and foremost, underscoring the EU
vision of the process of contracting for arbitration as one involving a
subjective experience of constraint rather than agency.38
This approach-which in some circumstances posits consumer
ignorance,39 vulnerability, and a lack of agency (as in the cases above)-
suggests an even more dramatic impact of the EU framework on
consumer subjectivity: the near erasure of the possibility of agency.
Rather than direct consumer behavior, which it implicitly posits as
largely irrelevant, the EU framework places responsibility on the
seller40 to refrain from unfair measures, and on the Member States to
raise the issue of fairness and enforce it. By placing the burden on the
seller to prove that a term has been individually negotiated (and, thus is
not necessarily subject to invalidation under the Directive),41 the
Directive influences the seller's (likely corporate) subjectivity, shaping it
as an unfair-term-averse entity situated in the broader European
market.
absence of a claim raised by a consumer. Id. Piers further notes that such an approach
would more commonly require the issue to be raised by the consumer. Id.
36. Piers suggests that this approach potentially impacts the viability of arbitration as
a dispute resolution process generally. Piers, supra note 6, at 225. Others show that
Member States have taken different approaches to arbitration provisions. Peter B.
Rutledge & Anna W. Howard, Arbitration Disputes Between Companies and Individuals:
Lessons from Abroad, 65 Disp. RESOL. J. 30 (2010) (suggesting that a level of uniform
process might tend to follow the ECJ's chosen approach).
37. See Alec Stone Sweet, The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU
Governance, in LIVING REVIEWS IN EU GOVERNANCE 70 (2010) (suggesting the broader
potential processes by which subjectivity may become homogenized through case law in
light of the significance ofjudicialization to European integration).
38. A due process consideration, Piers suggests, might open the door for a
consideration of whether the arbitration proceedings were fair and equitable. See Piers,
supra note 6, at 225.
39. See, e.g., The Directive, supra note 5, at 29 ("Whereas, generally speaking,
consumers do not know the rules of law which, in Member States other than their own,
govern contracts for the sale of goods or services; [W]hereas this lack of awareness may
deter them from direct transactions for the purchase of goods or services in another
Member State ... ").
40. For ease of reference, I use "seller" to denote both a party selling goods as well as
one supplying services, which both are covered but referred to separately by the language
of the Directive. The Directive, supra note 5, at 29.
41. The Directive asserts, however, that "[tihe fact that certain aspects of a term or one
specific term have been individually negotiated shall not exclude the application of this
Article to the rest of a contract if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is
nevertheless a pre-formulated standard contract." Id. at art. 2.
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II. A DIFFERENT FRAMING OF THE AUTONOMOUS SUBJECT: THE AMERICAN
CONTRACT REGIME
Against the backdrop of the EU's treatment of the consumer subject,
the particular nature of the American subject and the dynamics of
power and subjectivity that help shape him or her become all the more
salient. Freedom, understood in terms of agency and choice, has been
conceptually central to the law of contracts in the United States, with
American contract law developing, by some accounts, "roughly
coextensive with the free market."42 As it expanded in the nineteenth
century, contract law was understood to express a collective cultural
stake in individual agency and autonomy.
43 Geared toward facilitating
private decision-making and thus the release of individual creative
energy, the legal framework privileged objective indications of intent
and thereby reflected the primacy of the market.
44 In doing so, statutes
and case law established the parameters of agreement as an expression
of an autonomous individual.
Contract law in the United States has long privileged contract as an
exercise of freedom. In contrast to the EU approach, contract doctrine in
the United States imposes a "duty to read" on parties to a contract,
binding them to terms that they had the opportunity to read, even if
they did not do so in practice.45 In light of the conventional tendency,
indeed the rationality, of not reading fine print as a consumer, and the
lack of meaningful choice facing even the consumer who reads the terms
(for example, a consumer is unlikely to forgo a transaction because of a
unilateral modification provision),46 the application of the duty to read
in this context posits a subjectivity at odds with expected experienced
subjectivity.4
7
42. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20 (1965).
43. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT 5 (1998).
44. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 7, 10, 14, 21 (1956).
45. See Smith v. Humphreys, 65 A. 57, 59 (Md. 1906). For a discussion of the
incongruent application of this doctrine to ancillary consumer contract terms, see Tal
Kastner, How 'Bout Them Apples?: The Power of Stories of Agreement in Consumer
Contracts, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 67 (2014). The discussion that follows draws from and builds
on my examination of narratives of agreement and disparities of power in the specific
American context of contract case law and the doctrine of the "duty to read." Id.
46. These terms are prevalent in consumer contracts in the United States. See
generally Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!?: Limitations on the
Use of Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1101 (2010). See also the discussion
below in and accompanying notes 83, 122-28, infra.
47. See supra note 24. In today's environment, in which a significant aspect of the
appeal of online transactions is the experience of a streamlined transaction, a description
of "mass marketing" nearly a half-century ago continues to resonate: "a party may
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More recently, contract law in the United States has increasingly
taken at face value formalities of notice and indications of assent to
ancillary terms, including those such as forum selection and arbitration
provisions that modify the framework of litigation.48 In contrast to the
Directive as interpreted by the ECJ, case law in the United States has
affirmed and expanded the principle of presumptive enforceability of
such contract terms, in particular predispute arbitration provisions-
which, in the framework of U.S. doctrine, ostensibly reflect the wills of
the parties.49 In light of the practical limits on a consumer's ability to
reasonably believe that he is not expected to read a standardized document and would be
met with impatience if he did." John D. Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 341, 361 (1974); see Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the
Aberrance of Electronic Contracts, 89 CHI-KENT L. REV. 265, 284 (2014) (noting, in an
assessment of the current American consumer contract regime, that consumer assent is
"preordained by the coercive contracting environment so they proceed through the
contracting process as quickly as they can," thereby suggesting a feedback loop of
disempowerment). The fact that consumers do not actually observe this duty suggests
challenges of self-regulation consonant with the questions explored in the context of
regulations of banks and financial markets. See, e.g., Mika Viljanen, Making Banks on a
Global Scale: Management Based Regulation as Agencement, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 425-53 (2016); Jakob Schemmel, The ESA-Guidelines: Soft Law and Subjectivity in
the European Financial Market-Capturing the Administrative Influence, 23 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 455-503 (2016).
48. See Horton, supra note 4, at 607-08. For example, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held enforceable a forum
selection clause printed on the back of a ticket, which required any claims to be brought in
Florida, a state remote from the consumer's home. The majority acknowledged that the
provision could not be negotiated by the consumer but reasoned that consumers benefit
from the cost-savings to the firm of establishing the forum for litigation ex-ante, id. at
593-94, a position that privileges conjectured market forces over the subjectivity of the
consumer as an agent in contract. As Radin notes, however, this economic position has yet
to be empirically supported, and also presumes that the right to a fair trial is a
commodifiable good, exchangeable for purported cost-savings. RADIN, supra note 6, at 80,
32, 36. In this way, this approach differs from the European framework, which would treat
a predispute selection of a forum outside the consumer's Member State as unenforceable,
see Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. The
European approach, moreover, would subject a hard-to-access forum within the Member
State to the test of fairness under the Directive.
49. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (stating
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts state law rendering unenforceable class-
action waivers in arbitration agreements with consumers); see also Rent-a-Center, W.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67-70 (2010) (explaining that the arbitrator is to determine
challenges to the validity of employment agreements with arbitration provisions
governing challenges to arbitrability). In contrast, the Directive on Unfair Terms specifies
terms that require "the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by
legal provisions" as presumptively unfair. The Directive, supra note 5, at Annex 1 (q). See
also Rutledge & Howard, supra note 36, for variations in Member States' approaches to
arbitration provisions. Developments at the time of this article's publication, however,
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make meaningful choices concerning these provisions, which threaten to
deprive consumers of basic rights to recourse and trial,50 the case law
and resulting doctrine thereby obscures, and arguably defers to,
corporate power.5 1 In the process, the structure of the law naturalizes a
curtailment of rights in a framework of agency.5 2 In the American
context in which agency-at the very least, notice and manifested
assent-persists as a rhetorical prerequisite for contract, subjectivity
figures at the heart of this process of allocating power. The U.S. regime
thereby suggests an inversion of the European paradigm, in which
bargaining power is posited as a baseline for freedom and choice or,
more dramatically, in which sellers must internalize the responsibility
to avoid "unfair" terms.
Whereas the European regime, as indicated in the Directive,
categorizes predispute arbitration provisions as presumptively unfair,
the now ubiquitous challenge to the exercise of individual agency in the
form of predispute arbitrations in the United States53 can be seen as an
outgrowth of the American contractual ideal of agency and its inherent
tensions. With the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in
1925 as a response to businesses seeking contractual freedom in a
merchant-to-merchant context, predispute arbitration provisions
became presumptively enforceable, undifferentiated from other contract
terms.5 4 The U.S. Supreme Court's reaffirmation of this principle in
contexts beyond the merchant-to-merchant arena elides the knowledge
differential between the parties to a consumer transaction and the high
stakes of such provisions.
55
reflecting an increased awareness of the impact of arbitration provisions on individuals in
the United States. A rule recently proposed by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), established pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, aims to prohibit providers of certain financial products and
services from imposing arbitration agreement hat preclude class actions.
50. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
51. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Abandoning the Courts, 47 TRIAL 50 (2011) (tracing the
trend of the Supreme Court to favor arbitration, thereby rendering the "notion that an
injured person has a right to his or her day in court... increasingly a myth").
52. Chemerinsky identifies the near elimination of the right to trial as "a profound
change in American law." Id. at 54. Radin shows how the current consumer contract
regime in the United States precipitates "normative" and "democratic degradation."
RADIN, supra note 6, at 19-5 1.
53. See RADIN, supra note 6, at 5-9.
54. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) ("Arbitration agreements
are purely matters of contract.").
55. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776, 2777 (2010). For a discussion of the
expansion of the FAA, see also Horton, supra note 4, at 619-22. For a discussion of the
stakes of assent and the challenges faced by individuals confronted by such terms, see also
text accompanying notes 16-24, supra.
543
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:2
I turn now to the notion of choice and the complicated role of
subjectivity as it figures in relation to predispute arbitration provisions
by way of an example from consumer experience, specifically in the form
of terms imposed by a fittingly named company, American Express.
A. American Express and the American Paradigm: Leveraging the
Divide Between the Imagined and Experienced Consumer Subjectivity
In the framework of contract in the United States, contract terms,
including nonnegotiated ancillary terms in consumer transactions, are
commonly regarded as presumptively enforceable. In online
transactions, with terms of use or other ancillary terms, courts seek
evidence of "reasonable notice" of terms and a manifestation of an
individual's assent,56 though this ostensible commitment to agency and
the recognition of consumer subjectivity is highly formalized. Courts in
the United States regularly recognize so-called "constructive" notice in
the form of a visible indication of additional terms and manifestation of
assent, including a party's continued use of a site or other lack of action
to terminate a transaction.57 In the context of credit card agreements or
other ongoing transactions in which terms are unilaterally updated,
courts have found acceptance established by notice and the consumer's
continued use of services.58
Thus, the framework of contract in the United States presumes that
parties have read the terms, thereby ascribing a subjectivity capable of
assessing the deal and of making a choice to accept or reject it.59 This
erasure of the ignorant or incapable subject through the posited subject
who is both capable of assessing terms and free to reject them operates
in contrast to the European model, in which consumers are presumed to
have, and are thus given, limited agency, and businesses-the sellers
and suppliers-are posited as exploitative and must therefore be
restricted in the terms they may offer.
By way of further contrast, the example below suggests the power,
56. See, e.g., Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (citing
Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., 4:07CV1963 CDP, 2009 WL 586513, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6,
2009)).
57. See id. at 230 (quoting Southwest Airlines Co. v. Boardfirst, LLC, 2007 WL
4823761, at *5 (N.D.Tex. 2007)).
58. See Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002). Limits on the terms credit
card companies can impose on consumers, as well as certain notification requirements,
have been mandated under the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure
Act of 2009, but the practice of updating terms over time through notification of the
consumer remains.
59. As a baseline, courts will look for "reasonable notice" of the terms. See Specht v.
Netscape Comm'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002).
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perceived by knowledgeable corporations, of recognizing a consumer's
posited subjectivity (i.e., as viewed by courts) for purposes of future
enforceability, as well as his or her likely experienced subjectivity for
purposes of marketing and encouraging the consumer to take certain
actions. The ways in which a consumer's subjectivity is recognized by
the drafting party to a consumer contract, however, is perhaps best
understood as a manipulation of the consumer's subjectivity as well as
the particulars of existing doctrine. As such, the transaction is unlikely
to actually register in a consumer's subjective experience in the same
ways that it is interpreted in the legal framework.
The enforceability of predispute arbitration clauses has become
increasingly hard to assail under contract law in the United States. In
this context, American Express, a credit card company, updated its
terms in October 2012, as it frequently does, though this time through
an offer of ostensible options. The company sent cardholders a notice
that reveals the potential for leveraging the discrepancy between a
consumer's likely experience and the consumer subjectivity posited by
law in a framework of purported agency and choice. In particular, the
company orchestrated an enactment of choice in a way unlikely in
practice to be detected or experienced by the consumer subject. Using
plain language reflecting the doctrinal investment in contemplative
choice, American Express notified cardholders of the inclusion of an
arbitration provision in the updated cardholder agreement. The notice
explained: "We are making changes to the process for resolving legal
claims to provide more options. See the summary of our new process
below and the detailed language on the following pages for more on
these changes."60 In addition to using simple, accessible language,
reflecting both contract-drafting best practices as well as the notion of
contract as a document to be read and meaningfully considered by
parties, the notice went further, allowing consumers to reject the
predispute arbitration term by a specified date. In doing so, the firm
used the paradigm of contemplative and participatory agreement to
reinforce the legal validity of these procedural terms-terms unlikely in
practice to register at all with a consumer, much less offer a consumer
information that typical human processes of reasoning could weigh and
consider in-a meaningful way. As a result, this notice of "choice" and the
invitation to participate in determining terms further the process of
binding the consumer to terms to which he or she could not
60. Memorandum from American Express to Cardholders (October 24, 2012) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Memorandum from American Express]; see also Chris Moran,
American Express Tries to Sneak Forced Arbitration Clauses on Users, Gives until Feb. 15
to Opt Out, CONSUMERIST, Oct. 19, 2012, at http://consumerist.comJ2012f10/19/american-
express-tries-to-sneak-forced-arbitration-clause-on-users-gives-until-feb- 15-to-opt-outl.
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meaningfully agree in light of their functional illegibility.61 The firm
thereby mobilizes a narrative of participatory agreement in a
conversation with courts that, like the real meaning of the terms,
remains largely inaccessible to the consumer.62
In practice, this notice sidesteps much of the significance for each
party of the arbitration term. In the event of inaction by the cardholder,
the arbitration term binds by default, granting American Express the
ability to curtail the cardholder's legal remedies. It enables the company
to resolve a claim through binding arbitration, thereby precluding
litigation before a court, a jury trial, as well as a class action claim.63 In
addition to the fact that such a restriction could in practice preclude all
redress for the consumer,64  other implications of a predispute
arbitration term are unlikely to be salient to a consumer. Arbitration in
the consumer context has been identified as prone to the leveraging of
power by repeat players,65 who can designate an arbitrator potentially
61. Fine-print disclosures "are functionally unreadable (or at least indigestible) for
consumers with bounded cognitive capacity-i.e., everyone." Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A
Psychological Account of Consent o Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1749 (2014). To
borrow Stewart Macaulay's example, they might be thought of as terms written in lemon
juice, made legible only to those sufficiently in the know to have a candle handy. See
Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM
Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1966).
Over four decades ago, Arthur Leff similarly observed that, as with certain contract terms,
"[tihere are things about things that are opaque to the senses under all circumstances."
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 152 (1970). As such, Leff
proposed treating consumer transactions as a product rather than as a contract. Id. As
this discussion and empirical studies of individuals' responses to varying contract
conditions suggest, circumstances might affect how individuals react to fine print. See,
e.g., Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts:
Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL
STUD. 67 (2012); Zev J. Eigen, Experimental Evidence of the Relationship Between Reading
the Fine Print and Performance of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 124 (2012). As I argue, the legal framework in the United States
enables companies to use their knowledge of consumer tendencies to elicit formal but not
meaningful agreement.
62. See Horton, supra note 4, at 601; see also Michelle E. Boardman, Contra
Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2006).
63. On the third printed page of the amended terms, which pages followed the
cardholder's enumerated charges, a bolded paragraph states: "If arbitration is chosen by
any party, neither you nor we will have the right to litigate that claim in court or have a
jury trial on that claim. Further, you and we will not have the right to participate in a
representative capacity ... " Memorandum from American Express, supra note 59.
64. See supra note 16.
65. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1147, 1172 (2010). See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (highlighting
the dynamic of so-called "repeat players" who enjoy advantages over "one shot
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biased in favor of the return customer.66 More basically, arbitrators are
not necessarily bound by legal precedent nor subject to judicial review,
or even scrutiny by the public.6 7 As the European framework implies,
even if a consumer were to take the opportunity to read the fine print,
68
he or she is unlikely to conclude that the terms threaten to limit his or
her rights significantly. In addition, a consumer is ill-equipped to make
a rational assessment about the value of the infringement as it relates
to the transaction, even if he or she were aware of the stakes, due to the
inherent limits on human cognition.
Notwithstanding the fact that an individual is unlikely to
experience a meaningful choice when faced with the information
provided, the notice American Express sent to consumers presents the
provision as one that expands rather than limits choice. The company
asserts in the notice, "[Ojur Claims Resolution provision includes an
arbitration provision. This means that either you or we may choose to
have an arbitrator decide any claim instead of having the claim decided
by a court."69 The presentation of the default position of including a
predispute arbitration provision in the deal as a vehicle of choice and
agency is not simply an inaccurate description of the consumer's
experience but also potentially impacts his or her subjectivity-that is,
were he or she to read and try to weigh the term, the consumer would
likely misunderstand its implications. In addition, the notice not only
presumes the possibility of an informed waiver, it also posits a subject
with the potential to respond actively on the basis of knowledge and
rational assessment. It thereby conjures an increasingly unrealistic
subjectivity. Terms typically (and arguably rationally) go unread in an
environment in which they tend to be nonnegotiable and not easily
substitutable. In this context, such terms are thus unlikely to be seen,
counterparties and that the advantages are mutually reinforcing and further exacerbate
the power disparity between the two groups"); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael
Corkery, In Arbitration, a 'Privatization of the Justice System', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/20 15/1 /02/2business/dealbooklin-arbitration-a-privatization-of-
the-justice-system.html (providing background and anecdotal experiences of consumers
that entered into binding arbitration provisions).
66. See Budnitz, supra note 64, at 1172.
67. See id. at 1172-73. See generally Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising, and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. DiSP.
RESOL. 1 (discussing the various levels of judicial scrutiny proposed for decisions made
during arbitration).
68. The act of reading is, as firms know, itself unusual, and might not be deemed
reasonable as an empirical matter. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 24, at 704
(colorfully describing what would happen to an individual's life if he or she tried to read
all the disclosed terms encountered). See sources cited supra, note 24 (discussing how
people generally do not read contracts before agreeing to them).
69. Memorandum from American Express, supra note 59.
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let alone accurately weighed, given the need for specialized knowledge
and human cognitive tendencies impacting risk analysis.70 The disclosed
term thereby impedes the consumer's ability to overcome an already
sticky default. The assertion that follows in bold--"you may reject the
arbitration provision" as long as (in roman type) "you notify us in
writing before" an assigned date71-is unlikely to capture a consumer's
attention, much less provoke action, though it is likely to resonate with
a court.
72
Although some studies suggest the possibility of increasing
consumer engagement with contract provisions in certain situations,7 3
this evidence does not extend to terms, such as arbitration provisions,
that by their nature prove hard for individuals to assess.7 4 Moreover, as
the discussion above demonstrates, American Express manipulates the
way individuals are likely to understand the meaning of its terms. As
such, rather than register with a consumer and impact his or her
subjective experience as a party to contract accordingly, the features of
this notice, which ostensibly reflect and stem from this idea of
agreement involving agency and deliberation, have a very different
function in practice. These features include plain language, terms
emphasized in bold,7 5 and a formal offer of choice, of which a consumer
70. See generally Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117 (2007) (discussing the dangers of consumers' suboptimal
processing of information).
71. Memorandum from American Express, supra note 59.
72. In her empirical research on software license agreements, Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler finds that the prominence of the disclosure of the agreement does not
significantly affect readership or consumer behavior. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does
Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 96 (2012). Shmuel
Becher also discusses the limits of information disclosure and the limited effectiveness of
warnings in achieving their goals. See Becher, supra note 24, at 757-58.
73. See generally Zev J. Eigen, Experimental Evidence of the Relationship Between
Reading the Fine Print and Performance of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 124 (2012) (suggesting increased reading when information about the
deal is limited to the contract terms, which corresponds with increased contract
performance); Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts:
Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL
STUD. 67 (2012) (suggesting increased compliance when consumers are involved in
negotiating terms).
74. The nature of procedural contract terms exacerbates existing cognitive constraints
that impact individuals' ability to process and assess terms. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 246, 258 (1995);
Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1225-27.
75. Contract doctrine in the United States incorporates conventions of notification that
implicate the conspicuousness of a term as posited by law, as with the requirement that a
disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability in writing must be made in
conspicuous terms. See U.C.C. §2-316(2) (2012) and discussion infra; see also MacDonald
v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) ("A term is 'conspicuous' when it is
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is unlikely to take advantage.76 These formal indications of salience and
participation thereby reinscribe a narrative of agreement for courts,
while not being meaningfully experienced by a consumer. In this way,
these features paradoxically bolster a legal claim by the firm about the
contract terms' enforceability in light of what is posited by contract law
in the United States as objectively manifested assent.
Companies such as American Express are no doubt cognizant of the
challenges posed by such an ancillary provision to a consumer's rational
ability to assess its significance. Because of the reality of the consumer's
subjective experience and the extent to which it diverges from the
framework and subjectivity imagined by contract law in the United
States, these ostensible indications of deliberative choice expressed in
the language of the notice largely undermine this very possibility.
Instead of granting consumers agency in practice, they are far more
likely to function in support of the company's legal claim as to the
validity of these terms, which typically defy rational assessment-and
which a consumer in practice is unlikely to have subjected to a real
process of deliberation.77 In this manner, the structure of a competitive
written so that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate should notice it."). The
Uniform Commercial Code leaves determination of whether a term is conspicuous to a
court but explicitly discusses:
language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in
contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set off from
surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the
language.
U.C.C §1-201(10). Thus, regardless of empirical and experiential claims to the contrary, a
bolded or all-capitalized text marks itself as conspicuous to a court. But see MILES A.
TINKER, LEGIBILITY OF PRINT 65 (1963).
76. Leff noted the absurdity of regulating the process of contract formation by
facilitating more bargaining when meaning eludes the consumer. See Leff, supra note 60,
at 148-49. In addition, the tendency of consumers to ignore this notice will impact the
power of those who indeed opt out by reducing the potential class. This further
undermines the legal innovation of the class action, which acknowledges and seeks to
address the differential between the diffuse and limited power of individual consumers
facing the consolidated power of a repeat-player counterpart.
77. Damato v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 2013 WVL 3968765 (E.D.N.Y.), for example,
involved a similar arbitration provision binding on cable subscribers by default if they
failed to opt out as provided by the terms, which consumers received appended to their
bills. A federal district court, citing precedent favoring arbitration, rejected plaintiffs'
challenges that the arbitration provision was illusory and unconscionable, enjoining
consumers' class action suit for breach of the subscriber agreement and state consumer
protection laws. Id. at *8 (citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772,
2778 (2010)). This case also underscores the allocation of power of choice typical to such
transactions. In Damato, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that in light of numerous
lawsuits brought by the cable company in which it failed to invoke the arbitration
provision, it ought to be estopped from doing so in this case. The court's explanation lays
bare the balance of power, as only one party seems to have the right under the terms of
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market becomes compromised in a way anticipated by the Directive's
concern with "distortions of competition" in the context of consumer
ignorance.
78
In the above example, the company mobilizes a cultural narrative of
agreement and agency to establish valid, enforceable terms under
American contract doctrine in a way unlikely to be experienced by the
consumer due to the structure of the transaction and the nature of the
terms. American Express thereby redoubles its advantage over the
consumer in terms of knowledge, leveraging the difference between the
way courts and consumers understand the company's actions. As such,
in language that purports to promote agency, choice, and thus an
experience of participatory agreement, a powerful repeat player is able,
under existing contract doctrine in the United States, to override the
question of a consumer's subjectivity and agency and leverage this goal
of participatory agreement to its further advantage at the consumer's
expense. In a manner preempted by the EU framework, the corporate
subject is thereby enabled and encouraged to exploit the disparities
between the consumer's posited subjectivity and his or her likely
behavioral response.
This dynamic does not map onto the EU legal regime and cultural
sensibility of agency in the same way. In addition to terms in consumer
contracts that "exclud[e] or hinder[] the consumer's right to take legal
action or exercise any other legal remedy," such as mandatory
predispute arbitration provisions,79 the list of indicative unfair terms in
the Directive's Annex includes terms that "irrevocably bindo the
consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming
acquainted before the conclusion of the contract,"' 0 as well as those that
"enable[e] the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract
unilaterally without a valid reason which is specified in the contract."8'
Given the realities of the transaction process and the presumption
against arbitration provisions under the EU regime, as well as the ways
in which the EU framework minimizes consumer agency in its positing
of the consumer subject, this form of leveraging the inconsistencies
between predictable consumer subjectivity and the imagined contract
subject under law would not pass legal muster in Europe and thus
would not likely have the same impact. This example thereby
the agreement to opt for litigation: "[There is nothing inconsistent about seeking to
compel arbitration in one case and litigating in another case, since a party can waive its
right to compel arbitration." Id. at *4.
78. See The Directive, supra note 5.
79. See id.; id. at Annex § (q).
80. The Directive, supra note 5, at Annex § (i).
81. Id. at Annex § j).
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underscores distinctively American subjectivities-of the individual
consumer and of the (likely corporate) seller-that are being honed and
in the case of the consumer manipulated by an American notion of
agency and freedom manifested in the law.
The example that follows-a consumer transaction involving a
popular American figure-further illustrates the complex ways
subjectivities may be leveraged in the American framework, which
draws on a narrative of agreement as a vehicle of freedom. An online
sale of goods (which is also a potential export of culture), the transaction
discussed in the next section, however, operates in the global market-
open to residents of legal regimes beyond the United States. It thus
necessarily invites participation by consumers of widely differing
subjectivities, expectations, and protections under law. As such, the
transaction considered below offers a glimpse into the larger question of
how subjectivities framed by different legal regimes interact in the
global market, and reveals the need to attend to the dynamics of
subjectivity in an increasingly global arena.
B. "I'm Just Some Guy": A Virtual Handshake with Louis C.K and the
Unilateral Modification Provision
In the contract law regime in the United States, through formalized
conceptions of "reasonable notice" and "manifested assent," consumers
become bound to terms that individuals are already hard pressed, as a
cognitive matter, to assess meaningfully. This process thereby
reinforces the existing differential in power between individual
consumers and necessarily more knowledgeable, repeat-player sellers.
8 2
In the example below, a semblance of an authentic-if virtual-
handshake enables a corporate seller to pursue a relationship of trust
with an individual consumer to the company's benefit, while also
demonstrating the formalities of notice and assent to courts. In this
way, again, the seller establishes the binding nature of terms that are
likely unknown to consumers and, moreover, due to the inclusion of a
provision to this effect, remain in the company's unilateral power to
change.83 In addition, the way the company appeals to subjectively
experienced agreement serves to mobilize compliance with a company's
terms. It also furthers formal agreement and thereby bolsters
82. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
83. See Horton, supra 4, at 635 (overviewing the "twisted" nature of the law of
unilateral modification); see also id. at 624-36 (discussing how courts that follow Badie v.
Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998) (including New York courts) might
reject certain additions to contract that are not mentioned in the initial deal, though not
all courts have followed this approach).
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enforceability in the United States of an open-ended cipher by virtue of
a unilateral modification provision-a term that in practice an
individual consumer has little capacity to agree to in a meaningful
way.
84
The structure of the online transaction I turn to below sharply
illustrates the way contract law in the United States enables parties in
positions of power to capitalize on a particular posited subjectivity as
well as on a cultural narrative of agreement. In addition, this example
demonstrates the extent to which the American contract regime elides
actual consumer experience of this dynamic, and the allocation of power
that results from this elision. In particular, this transaction reflects the
resonance of the almost mythic traditional American contract paradigm
of free agents coming to a mutually beneficial agreement through
interpersonal dealings, and the accompanying and thus strengthened
bond of trust. It suggests moreover the way in which the evocation by a
seller of this traditional American notion of contract-and of a
consumer's subjective experience thereof--can generate value for the
seller. The deal's presentation and marketing actively distinguishes the
transaction from the counternarrative of contract as a collection of
potentially burdensome terms imposed by a more powerful seller or
service provider on the consumer irrespective of the consumer's will. 8 5
As such, the marketing and framing of the deal leverage a narrative,
and a consumer's subjective experience, of a classic bilateral agreement
involving choice and agency.86 In light of the inclusion of ancillary
procedural contract terms, however-here, in particular, a unilateral
modification provision-this structure and its evocation of a subjective
experience of agency in practice grant the seller the power to curtail the
84. In the European context, this scenario that follows would resonate differently. As I
discuss below, the explicitly noncorporate, "ordinary guy" persona assumed by the seller
(belied by the actuality of a corporate selling entity) and the content of his message might
be considered as part of the deal, while the fine print would not.
85. As Stewart Macaulay pointed out to me, this other narrative of contract has
entered the cultural conversation in the United States in the marketing by cell phone
providers of "no-contract' contracts free of long-term commitments but not of ancillary
terms. See No Contract Plans, VIRGIN MOBILE, http://www.virginmobileusa.com/cel-
phone-plans/?cid=ppc-google-p-desktp-nb---plans-nnbrand-no-c ontract---exact- no
contractphonesexact (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (advertising Virgin Mobile's offering of
"no-contract plans"); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, No Contract? (Coarse-
Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 636, 2013) (discussing the advent of the
"no-contract" phenomenon and consumer lack of understanding that contractual
obligations still typically apply).
86. Whereas, under European law, marketing and framing could be viewed as part of
the deal to which parties agreed, overriding an integration provision in fine print, in the
United States such an integration provision would be presumptively binding, foreclosing
the possibility of incorporating other terms.
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consumer's agency.
At the end of 2011, the American comedian Louis C.K. garnered
media attention8 7 for the relatively unusual structuring of his concert
video sales.88 Eschewing the conventional distributor-middleman, Louis
C.K. chose to market a recording of his live comedy shows9 directly to
fans via a $5 download from his website.
90 This structure left the
comedian vulnerable to piracy. Nonetheless, he netted $750,000 on a
$250,000 investment within a week.91 In this manner, Louis C.K.
epitomized the American entrepreneur, capitalizing on the workings of
an efficient market to get his product directly to eager consumers. The
transaction's savvy pricing clearly struck consumers as a good deal and
facilitated its success. Louis C.K. stated, "I've gotten so many tweets
and emails from people who say, 'I torrent everything and I'm not
torrenting this92... Because the gap from stealing and buying with these
things-for $5, you're almost stealing it. So it tips the scales more
easily."'
93
Notwithstanding press coverage of the felicitous financial outcome
of the experiment for the comedian-and arguably the consumer--one
aspect of this transaction was not noted: namely, the way both the
structure and marketing of the transaction leverages a narrative, and
the subjective experience, of traditional American contract. In addition
to shrewd pricing, the framing of the transaction as an interpersonal
87. See Tom Cheredar, Louis CK's Digital Distribution Experiment Clears $1M in 12
Days, VB MEDIA (Dec. 22, 2011), http:l/venturebeat.com/2011/12/22/louis-cks-special-1-
million.
88. He was not, however, the first to try this model. Radiohead, an English band,
similarly drew attention for releasing their music directly to their fans. The band also
allowed fans to set their own prices. See Eduardo Porter, Radiohead's Warm Glow, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1O/14/opinionll4sun3.html; see also
LOUIS CK, www.louisck.net (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (click "Buy/Watch Shows" at top of
page to see show videos for sale) (showing that Louis C.K.'s website has since added
subsequent shows for sale under the same format).
89. This show was titled "Louis C. K.: Live at the Beacon Theater."
90. By Louis C.K.'s account, by pursuing this model, he was able to offer the video to
consumers at a much lower price than the $20 an intermediary distributor would have
charged for the same material. See A Statement from Louis C.K, LOUIS C.K. (Dec. 13,
2011), http://buy.louisck.netlnews/a-statement-from-louis-c-k. The video was also
presented without any digital-rights management, which meant it could be easily pirated.
See David Carr, A Comic Distributes Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/business/media/louis-ck-plays-a-serious-joke-on-tv-
the-media-equation.html?pagewanted=all.
91. Carr, supra note 90. The comedian also retained the rights to the production in
perpetuity. Id.
92. "Torrenting" refers to a way to download and share files for free.
93. Louis C.K Reflects On 'Louie,' Loss, Love And Life, NPR (Dec. 13, 2011), available
at http://www.npr.org/2011/12/13/143581710/louis-c-k-reflects-on-louie-loss-love-and-life.
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agreement and the engagement in doing so of the consumer's
subjectivity (both as expected behavior and as legally posited behavior)
likely played a significant role in facilitating the favorable outcome for
the comedian.
The deal, in its streamlined structure, pricing, and, notably, its
presentation on Louis C.K.'s website, draws on the comedian's persona
as a "scabrous and successful champion of the everyman"94 and his
relationship with his fans. The web page, offering the opportunity to
download the videos of various shows in exchange for $5, includes an
appeal to refrain from pirating the shows.95 The language of the
comedian's entreaty implicitly invokes an ideal of contract as
experienced agreement, which may implicate a moral or ethical
responsibility.96 Disclaiming corporate involvement in the deal, the
comedian's request also indirectly conjures the specter of a coercive
contract and presents the transaction, by way of contrast, as a
traditional contract exchange-a "meeting of minds"97 between
individuals on a fair and even playing field, sealed with a handshake.
The simple presentation of the transaction on Louis C.K.'s site
reinforces a buyer's sense of its straightforwardness. The following text
appears under a brief description of a show offered for sale, such as
94. Carr, supra note 89.
95. Following the initial success of this transaction structure, a number of shows
featuring Louis C.K. and others have been offered on the Louis C.K. website, using the
same framework. See LoUis CK, www.louisck.net (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (click
"Buy/Watch Shows" at top of page to see show videos for sale) (showing that Louis C.K.'s
website has since added subsequent shows for sale under the same format).
96. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1, 4-5 (1981); Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Is a Contract a Promise?, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
241, 241 (Andrei Marmor ed. 2012). Louis C.K.'s comments support the notion that
consumers considered the ethics of the transaction. As Louis C.K. stated: "I think it is
really interesting that I brought the price so close to stealing and made the movie so easy
to get and made it so clear that it's a human offering that it sparked a debate about
pirating. To steal from someone and not feel bad, you either have to be a sociopath or view
the act differently." Carr, supra note 90, at 4.
97. Contract doctrine in the United States embraces a so-called objective approach to
contract formation, treating the appearance of intent, rather than its actual existence, as
binding. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6 115 (4th ed. 2004); ROBERT A.
HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 39-40 (2004); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI
AND PERILLO ON CONTRACT LAW § 2.2 26-28 (5th ed. 2003); see also Lawrence M. Solan,
Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 353 (2007). Although the idea of a
"meeting of minds" of parties has come to be understood as an objective indication of
assent rather than a subjective psychic connection, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. (c), courts in the United States nonetheless routinely invoke the
rhetoric of subjectively experienced agreement. See, e.g., May v. Wilcox, 182 A.D.2d. 939,
939 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). Some circumstances arguably give weight to whether
subjectively experienced agreement actually took place. See Solan, supra, at 359-73.
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"Live at the Beacon Theater,"98 and a short note about the availability of
both video and audio formats:
The cost is $5.00.
Please don't torrent or otherwise steal this so I can keep
doing things this way. More on that here.99
To buy this thing, do this:
1. Enter your email (We will NOT bother you).
2. Choose below to pay with PayPal, Amazon, Dwolla,
or BitPay.
3. Watch the show, download the show, ignore the
show. Whatever you want. After that, you never,
ever have to hear from me again. Unless you want
to. 100
In this way, the web page presents consumers with the price and
product, so-called "performance terms," or the terms of the deal
foremost in each party's mind. 01 Other than a plea to a buyer to abide
by the terms, imbuing the consumer with the agency and responsibility
for the ongoing possibility of such a transaction, not much else is
included. Thus, the language of the deal highlights the consumer's
agency and will, and presents a recognition of the consumer's autonomy
as another feature of the transaction. By granting the consumer the
options to "[w]atch ... download ... ignore the show ... [w]hatever you
want," the site offers the consumer the opportunity to exercise agency
unmolested ('We will NOT bother you") as part of the deal.
The bottom of the video purchase page presents a message from the
comedian expanding on the brief request not to "torrent or otherwise
steal" his product. There, a consumer encounters a note from Louis C.K.
that leverages a good faith relationship. The note marshals the agency
of the seller as well as the consumer, and a sense of common purpose
and agreement shared between them to induce compliance with the
terms of the deal. Directly above the sign-off "Sincerely, Louis C.K." at
98. Louis CK Live at the Beacon Theater, Louis CK, https://louisck.net/purchase/live-
at-the-beacon-theater (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). The format is the same or similar for
various shows available for purchase on the site.
99. Id. This sentence hyperlinks to a note further down the page titled, "[t]o those who
might wish to 'torrent' these shows."
100. Id.
101. According to Burton and Andersen, "[p]erformance terms are included in an
agreement for the purpose of defining the primary benefits the parties intended to flow to
one of them as a result of the contract. The most obvious performance terms are promises,
express or implied-in-fact, that a certain action, such as the delivery of goods or the
rendering of services, will be taken." Burton & Andersen, supra note 4, at 873.
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the very bottom of the page, one can see a box labeled "To those who
might wish to 'torrent' these shows." The text in this box suggests the
comedian reaching out personally, though virtually, to the consumer, a
connection all the stronger in this context of a much-loved entertainer
reaching out to his fans.0 2 The note states, "I made these files
extremely easy to use against well-informed advice ... because I want it
to be easy for people to watch and enjoy this video in any way they want
without 'corporate' restrictions."103 Reinforcing a semblance of personal
interaction, a brief paragraph follows:
Please bear in mind that I am not a company or a
corporation. I'm just some guy. I paid for the production
and posting of this video with my own money. I would
like to be able to post more material to the fans in this
way, which makes it cheaper for the buyer and more
pleasant for me. So, please help me keep this being a
good idea. I can't stop you from torrenting; all I can do is
politely ask you to pay your five little dollars, enjoy the
show, and let other people find it in the same way. 104
The transaction is thereby presented in terms of an ideal of contract
involving genuine mutual understanding and trust, framing each party
as freely choosing individuals. The language on the web page promises
the ideal rewards of contract through adherence to its terms: both
parties will be better off as a result of the deal. Indeed, this text
obliquely suggests a social responsibility and the possibility of collective
betterment from the transaction in its "polite" request that consumers
"pay [their] five little dollars, enjoy the show, and let other people find it
in the same way." In this way, it subtly validates and idealizes the
contract framework.105 In addition, by noting "well-informed" advice and
the decision to dismiss it, the seller again distances itself from the
cultural paradigm of the corporate actor whose message and terms are
understood to be mediated by sophisticated experts.106 The seller
102. Thanks to Ryan Mitchell for highlighting this aspect of the
transaction/relationship. By drawing on the comedian's public persona, the text on the
page also both taps into and reinforces the ideal dynamic between comedian and audience
of mutual understanding, or the connection inherent in "getting the joke."
103. Louis CK Live at the Beacon Theatre, supra note 98.
104. Id.
105. Thanks to Tara Helfman for making this point.
106. An advisory memorandum issued by the law firm Arnold & Porter, LLP on case law
concerning the enforceability of class action waivers demonstrates the role of sophisticated
legal advisors in repeat-players' contract drafting and the specialized nature of the
information these advisors provide. Outlining the Supreme Court's holding in American
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thereby invokes an ideal of contract involving mutual understanding
and free will as a model of social interaction, indeed, as a model social
structure. The seller uses this ideal to bolster a sense of mutual
responsibility and thus, if the seller succeeds, compliance with terms. As
such, the transaction demonstrates the potential to generate a
subjective experience of agreement, or at least a willful act of
compliance on the part of the consumer.
10 7
At the same time, this contract deviates from the ideal model of
mutual understanding between equals on a level playing field in a
significant but inconspicuous way. The narrative of mutuality relied on
by the contract and implicit in its presentation does not alter its
fundamentally adhesive character, as revealed by the inclusion of
procedural terms governing the parties' rights and responsibilities
under the deal in its "terms and conditions."10 8 Thus, the relation
facilitated by marketing a narrative of agency and contemplative
exchange between two "guys" or equals situates the parties in another
framework. In this framework the drafting party can mobilize in its
favor the power of the state behind terms likely to be unknown or even
unknowable by the consumer. Indeed, these terms may be contrary to
expectations of the contract subject precipitated by the marketing of the
deal.
Thus, notwithstanding the streamlined transaction structure, the
fine-print contractual framework follows a conventional model of online
consumer transactions in the United States. While the website presents
little more than the text discussed above, two opportunities to enter an
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013), the Arnold & Porter
memorandum cautioned clients drafting consumer agreements (i.e., repeat-player sellers)
"to consider carefully the omission of a class action waiver from its standard terms" in
light of the Court's statement hat arbitration and class action waiver agreements will be
rigorously enforced. Arnold & Porter, LLP, Supreme Court Finds Arbitration Agreements
Waiving Class Actions Preclude Antitrust Class Actions Even Where Individual Claims Are
Small, ARNOLD PORTER LLP 3, http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/
ADVItalianColors.pdf (last updated June 2013).
107. In another context, Zev Eigen has shown how negotiating a seemingly
inconsequential term might influence a party's sense of commitment to the deal. See Zev
J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: Experimental
Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise and Performance, UNIV. CHi. L. 8,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files[Eigen%20Paper.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
108. See Kessler, supra note 4, at 632. Kessler identified the issue of the weaker party's
inability to shop around for better terms as a function of a monopoly or of standardization
of terms in the market. Id. For a consumer in the United States today, the ability to shop
for terms is compromised in a subtler manner by the cognitive biases and limitations of
the consumer, as discussed above.
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e-mail address, and a few explicit terms 10 9-reinforcing the sense of a
sensible, transparent transaction between two individuals-it also
includes language in a smaller font that asserts to the purchaser, "By
purchasing, you agree to our Terms & Conditions."110
This statement appears immediately above options for payment,
and the words "Terms & Conditions" are presented in the form of a
hyperlink. If clicked, the link opens to another web page that presents
plainly written terms of use consisting of 3,900 words in white font over
a dark background with an image of the comedian speaking to his
audience."' Despite the assertion by Louis C.K. on the site that he is
"not a company or a corporation" but "just some guy," the terms
establish that a corporate entity, Pig Newton Inc., grants the consumer
a license to download and access the content for noncommercial
personal use, restricting any public presentation of the materials. The
terms reserve all rights to the content to Pig Newton Inc. n 2
109. The terms are: "This is a gift"; 'Yes, I'd like to receive further emails about Louis
C.K. things" or "No, leave me alone forever, you fat idiot" in response to the question, "I'm
going to be offering other things through this site. Would you like to hear about them?" Id.
110. A prior iteration of the page required a purchaser to check a box next to the words
"I agree with the Terms & Conditions" in order to proceed to purchase, taking the form of
so-called "clickwrap." See Hoffman v. Supplements ToGo Mgmt., 18 A.3d 210, 219 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). In their current form, the terms are presented as so-called
"browsewrap," Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. Rev. 429, 431 (2002), the validity of which will depend on
"whether the user has actual or constructive knowledge of a website's terms and
conditions," Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., 795 F.Supp.2d 770, 790 (N.D. Ill. 2011); in
other words, whether it is sufficiently conspicuous to serve as notice to the consumer of
the existence of terms.
111. Terms of Use, LOUIS CK (last visited Apr. 6, 2016), https://louisck.net/terms-and-
conditions [hereinafter Terms of Use page].
112. Id. The second paragraph under the heading "Terms of Use," asserts that "[t]hese
Terms of Use are a legal agreement between you and the Site," which the terms define as
louisck.net, perhaps a function of awkward drafting. Id. The grant of rights and licenses,
however, is made by Pig Newton Inc. (or the "we" or "us" of the Terms), establishing a
transaction between the user and Pig Newton. Id. According to the Terms, "by using
and/or accessing the Site, you [the purchaser] are expressly agreeing to abide by the
following terms." Id. The terms grant the purchaser a "Viewing Period" of "Indefinite"
duration, though they also reserve to the seller the right to change the viewing policy at
any time. Id. The terms also contain other common provisions, including a forum selection
clause limiting suits to courts in New York; disclaimers of warranties; limitations of
liability; indemnification of Pig Newton with its "affiliates, parent companies,
subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees, agents and network service providers"; and, an
integration provision that incorporates "policies and guidelines" posted on the site,
including a privacy policy, available on the site. Id. The terms also reserve to Pig Newton
the right to make unilateral changes to the policy at any time, with continued use of the
site signaling acceptance, and any "substantive changes" to the privacy policies will be
posted in bulletins on the site or sent to users by email. Id. Use of the site following these
updates also constitutes agreement according to the terms. Id.
POSITING AND LEVERAGING LEGAL SUBJECTS
In this way, the transaction structure reflects the two tiers of
subjectivity that a consumer contract implicates under contract law in
the United States and thus the paradoxical role of fine print in
American consumer transactions. The accessibly worded terms on the
purchase web page correspond to consumers' expectation of a
streamlined, transparent transaction concerning the essential terms-
price and product of interest. The streamlined presentation of this main
page- the only one a purchaser must visit to complete the transaction
beside the page eliciting a consumer's actual payment information-
reflects the conventional wisdom (and empirical data) that consumers
will not read the fine-print terms of use.11 3 At the same time, the
transaction structure engages another imagined or posited subjectivity,
that of the consumer bearing the duty to read under contract law in the
United States.
In practice, as with the terms sent to cardholders by American
Express, the ancillary terms are directed at another audience and
invoke another framework of agreement hat implicates the consumer.
Under contract doctrine in the United States, ancillary contract terms
are considered presumptively enforceable, and signs or actions on the
part of a consumer, such as proceeding to purchase, are posited as
uncoerced assent.11 4 As such, the "Terms of Use" on the Louis C.K. site
113. See supra note 24. The Massachusetts District Court noted in a case involving an
online agreement and the question whether a consumer assented to a forum selection
clause: "With regard to forum selection clauses in clickwrap agreements-despite the fact
that probably less than one person in 10,000 ever reads them, or has the slightest idea
what they say-courts routinely hold that they are valid and enforceable." Bagg v.
Highbeam Research Inc., 862 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 (D. Mass. 2012).
114. Challenges to contract terms under the doctrine of unconscionability in the United
States are hard to mount successfully. Courts typically use a two-pronged sliding scale of
procedural and substantive unconscionability. Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable
Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. Rev. 359, 364-72
(2001). "Procedural unconscionability [deals with] the formalities of making the contract,
while substantive unconscionability [deals with] the terms of the contract itself." Major v.
McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 232 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (Rahmeyer, J., concurring). The
procedural baselines required generally hew to the need for notice, as a formal matter,
exemplified in the much-cited case of Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 17
(2d Cir. 2002), which invalidated a predispute arbitration term in a software license only
visible to a consumer who scrolled down below the download button. In a transaction like
those presented on the Louis C.K. site that involve "browsewrap" terms, which require no
affirmative action by the seller to view or accept terms, courts will look to whether the
terms were "prominently displayed so as to provide reasonable notice." See Zappos.com,
Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 893 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1063-64 (2012); Hines v.
Overstock.com, 668 F.Supp.2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd 380 Fed.Appx. 22 (2d Cir.
2010). In light of the case law viewing ancillary terms such as forum selection and
arbitration provisions as substantively conscionable, a seller offering a degree of formal
notice of terms would not likely be vulnerable to a finding of unconscionability.
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conform to drafting conventions of conspicuousness and plain language,
harnessing the presumption that the manifestation of agreement will be
deemed enforceable.115
Reflecting a doctrinal investment in notice if not comprehension, the
"Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitation of Liability" printed in all-
capital letters hews to the requirement that disclaimers of any implied
warranty of merchantability in writing must be conspicuous.'1 6
Similarly, the integration provision that establishes that the fine-print
terms "together with the Policies posted on the Site" constitute the
"entire agreement" regarding use of the site, appears in bolded font." 7
The use of relatively clear and simple language and syntax in the
terms1 18  also suggests the drafter's awareness of the doctrinal
investment in a consumer's access to terms as a formal matter, which
impacts enforceability. 119
A buyer conforming to the tendency not to read the terms might not
be surprised by many of them, which arguably match a purchaser's
reasonable expectations of the transaction. According to the terms, Pig
Newton, Louis C.K.'s company, grants the buyer a license for personal,
noncommercial private use of the content. Licensing the content for
115. Drafters might also include terms to promote compliance even if the terms are not
actually legally enforceable. As recent empirical studies show, the inclusion of terms in a
contract leads people to be more likely to view them as legally enforceable and fair. See
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Contracts Without Terms, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (Feb.
24, 2016), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty-scholarship/1633. This is
another way in which presumptive enforceability of fine print reinforces the advantage of
a more powerful party over a weaker one. See Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling
Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1137 (2009)
(highlighting the negative implications of unenforceable terms for unknowing. employees
to the benefit of sophisticated counterpart employers); see also RADIN, supra note 6, at 216
(proposing tort remedies for rights-deletion schemes through fine print).
116. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2014).
117. See Terms of Use page, supra note 111. The presentation of an integration
provision in a "conspicuous" type reflects the rule in most of the United States; including
New York, where this agreement would be litigated by its terms, that a merger provision
creates a strong presumption that the parties intended the written document as a
complete integration of their agreement. See, e.g., Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office,
474 F. Supp. 672, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also TINA L. STARK, NEGOTIATING AND
DRAFTING CONTRACT BOILERPLATE 567 (2003).
118. See Terms of Use page, supra note 111. Under the heading "Accuracy," for example,
the site states: "[w]e cannot and do not guarantee or warrant the accuracy of any
information found on the Site. Although we have attempted to make such information
accurate at the time it was posted, any action taken or not taken by you as the result of
reviewing information on the Site is solely at your risk."
119. Scholars have questioned the application of the conspicuousness tandards taken
from the paper-document contracting context to electronically presented terms. See Nancy
S. Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic Contracts, 89 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 265, 274 (2014).
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private viewing, the terms explicitly rule out presentation in a dorm
lounge or restaurant, as well as a viewing for which the consumer
charges a fee. In addition, Pig Newton reserves rights to the content on
the site and protects the materials under federal and state trademark
and copyright laws. The Terms also grant the purchaser a "Viewing
Period" of "Indefinite" duration. The company disclaims liability
resulting from viruses and links to the site, and provides the product on
an "'as-is' basis."'1
20
The Terms, however, reserve the right for Pig Newton "to make
changes to [the] Viewing Policy at any time." In addition, the Terms
contain a unilateral modification provision. Whereas the terms reject
"[a]ny attempt" by the consumer to "alter the terms and conditions of
this agreement without [Pig Newton's] express written consent," the
company "reserve[s] the right, at [its] sole discretion, to change, modify,
add or remove portions of these Terms of Use, at any time." According to
the terms, consumers are responsible for checking the site for changes;
continued use constitutes assent.121 As such, the fine print in this
transaction potentially undermines the nature of the deal as one of
mutual understanding. Such an open-ended ancillary term not only
poses challenges to a consumer's ability to weigh the term's potential
impact,122 but operates at odds with the notion of facilitating agreement
on which the deal capitalizes.123 In this way, the unilateral modification
provision operates as a term that resists meaningful comprehension by
an individual; it cannot correspond with a consumer's reasonable
expectations. As such, this fine-print provision creates a disjunction
between the consumer's experience of the transaction with the seller-
his or her expected subjectivity suggested by the streamlined purchase
webpage on which Louis C.K. seems to speak directly to him or her
about the deal-and the way the seller (a corporation, in this case) has
constructed the transaction to establish its enforceability for courts in
the United States.
While the inclusion of the unilateral modification provision opens
120. See Terms of Use page, supra note 111. Scholars view "as is" as a term
comprehensible to consumers. See RADIN, supra note 6, at 184; John J. A. Burke, Contract
as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 318 (2000).
Additionally, Tina Stark asserts, "the warranty names mean something to lawyers and
judges, but 'as is, where is' is likely to communicate the meaning of this section
[disclaiming warranties] more immediately to the contracting parties." STARK, supra note
117, at 234.
121. See Terms of Use page, supra note 111.
122. See Becker, supra note 69 (discussing the dangers of consumers' suboptimal
processing of information).
123. Horton, supra note 4, at 649 (outlining the ways in which a unilateral modification
provision in particular frustrates ostensible consumer efforts to shop for the best terms).
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the deal up to include terms unknown, and unknowable, by the
consumer at the time of purchase, the clause simultaneously
strengthens the seller's argument for enforceability of altered terms vis-
A-vis U.S. courts. A federal court opinion explains,
Unilateral modification terms . . . are not necessarily
effective . . . [b]ut the inclusion of such terms at least
helps to bolster the offeror's argument that the offeree is
on inquiry notice of later arriving terms, particularly
where the modification (or amendment) is itself
submitted in such a manner that a reasonable offeree
would be likely to see it. 124
The court's assessment reflects the presumptive enforceability in
the United States of such a term, which itself facilitates the alteration of
other terms, such as a forum selection or choice-of-law clauses.125 These
provisions remain beyond an individual's meaningful subjective
engagement even when known to the consumer, all the more so when
subject to unilateral revision.126 The disconnect between the experienced
and posited subjectivities, which exists to some extent in every
application of law, is especially troubling here because of the way in
which it subverts the ostensible goals of contract as facilitating
agreement and agency.127 In addition, in this case, the disjunction
between likely experienced subjectivities, on one hand, and posited
subjectivities, on the other, enables the seller to further leverage its
power at the potential expense of the consumer. Moreover, the seller's
presentation of itself in terms of its own purported individual
subjectivity precipitates a particular subjective experience by the buyer,
which in turn can prompt the buyer to take action in a likely state of
ignorance of such actions' implications, all to the benefit of the seller.
Louis C.K. and his production company Pig Newton wield far less
power in the market than a firm like American Express. Louis C.K.'s
site highlights his identity as "just some guy" and his vulnerability to
the possibility of illegal exploitation. By the same token, however, the
124. Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2012).
125. Again, this contrasts with the European legal framework, in which such fine print
terms would be presumptively unenforceable, or, in the case of licensing terms, subject to
the parties' right of termination (which could also end a consumer's license to view the
show).
126. See Horton, supra note 4, at 638-39. In the United States, the enforceability of a
choice-of-law clause depends, among other things, on the existence of a "substantial
relationship" between parties and the state specified. Id. at 637 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971)).
127. See Kastner, supra note 45, at 76.
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transaction marshals this vulnerability, as well as the comedian's
persona as an accessible, straight-shooting everyman, in a framework of
seemingly genuinely-experienced agreement to bolster trust and thus
compliance. In the framing of a sale as a virtual handshake, the
narrative of agreement in which the site engages serves as a marketing
strategy for the specific product as well as for the comedian's brand. In
this manner, this transaction demonstrates the potential for the idea of
a contract experienced as agreement-a meaningful, subjectively
experienced understanding between freely acting parties-to exert its
power to facilitate the maximization of value.
In this case, though, contract law in the United States enables the
seller to leverage the power of legal enforceability of open-ended terms
inaccessible to the consumer. The contract terms behind the purchase
page that govern the parties under contract law in the United States
undermine the very transparency on which the transaction capitalizes.
The notification of a consumer as to "Terms of Use" and their
availability in plain language also demonstrates a doctrinal investment
in the possibility of experienced agreement. The notion of freedom of
contract in the doctrine, however, is embedded in a privileging of the
market and the formalities of contract formation-as distinct from the
European vision of a market that must be corrected to allow for
competition.
As a result, under the contract regime in the United States, the
consumer's likely experience diverges from the experience of the
consumer as a freely assenting subject as constructed by law. The
conceptual investment in formal agreement thereby serves as a tool for
a seller to leverage further its existing power in relation to the
consumer. In this case, the seller-drafter marshals the formal legal
indications of "agreement," along with the persuasive power of a
semblance of genuine experienced agreement generated by the purchase
page, which itself facilitates the act of formalized consent. These two
channels of notional agreements (as presented to consumer and as
presented to courts) diverge from one another to the potential detriment
of the consumer. In the aspect of the deal that likely elides a consumer's
subjective experience, terms that resist a consumer's rational scrutiny
become enforceable through posited signs of agreement elicited in part
through the consumer's experience of (a substantively different)
agreement.
CONCLUSION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
The online purchase of content from Louis C.K.'s site and the
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amendment of terms by American Express are just two examples that
suggest he disjunction between imagined and experienced subjectivities
created by the current legal framework in the United States in the area
of consumer contracting. In a global consumer environment, this
dynamic becomes even more complex, and perhaps more pronounced. As
suggested by the goals of the Directive, the differing approaches of the
legal regimes potentially condition consumer subjectivities to the extent
that the conception of values such as freedom and the valuation of
rights expressed by the legal structure influence normative
expectations.128 In addition, these subjectivities can be manipulated in
various ways depending on the legal regime and social framework. In
the European context, the doctrine seeks to constitute a subject with
certain inalienable rights and, in doing so, may override a subjectivity
informed by the specific parameters of national law.129 In the process,
the European framework, perhaps paradoxically, posits a consumer
subject lacking much agency. It also constitutes a seller-subject that
must internalize certain consumer protections.
Considering the role of subjectivity also makes salient the potential
for a legal regime to empower private actors to manipulate
subjectivities. This is the case in the United States as a result of the
formal and notional privileging of agreement as an ideal in a framework
in which terms deemed unfair under European law are presumptively
enforceable. In the American context, firms are posited as benign
contractual actors and, as such, are empowered to leverage their
advantages (and a consumer's disadvantages), which go unrecognized by
law.
This discussion also underscores the extent to which the
vulnerability of individual subjects to these forms of power may vary in
a global market depending on the legal regime they inhabit, though the
precise way in which this may take place demands further study. Unlike
many websites that explicitly provide different terms for users in
different legal regimes, Louis C.K.'s site, for example, both
acknowledges this possibility and largely sidesteps its implications. As
the Terms of Use on the Louis C.K. site suggest, the seller envisions the
possibility of selling in a global market and addresses consumers
outside the United States in a "Note to International Users" included in
128. Cf. RADIN, supra note 6, at 15-16 (discussing the creation of a situation of
normative degradation from the treatment of circumstances that do not involve choice as
involving choice).
129. See, for example, Rutledge & Howard, supra note 36, at 33, for different
approaches to arbitration provisions by Member States, including differing allocations of
the burden of proof and thus variations in the extent to which terms are treated as
presumptively unfair.
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the Terms. Asserting that "[t]he Site is hosted in the United States and
is intended for and directed to users in the United States," the seller
nonetheless seeks to capitalize on the economic benefits of global sales
while attempting, rhetorically at least, to override regional governing
law. Thus it continues, "If you are a user accessing the Site from the
European Union, Asia, or any other region with laws or regulations
governing personal data collection, use, and disclosure that differ from
United States laws, please be advised that through your continued use
of the Site, which is governed by U.S. law, this Privacy Statement, and
the Terms of Use of the Site," you, the consumer, "consent to" the
transfer of personal information to the United States.13 0 Much of the
Terms would be deemed presumptively unfair under the Directive and
thus unenforceable under European law, not least the seller's unilateral
ability to change the terms of the deal (the Viewing Policy) at any
time.13 1 At the same time, this example makes salient the various
dynamics of subjectivities necessarily in play, and the ways in which
these dynamics may be informed and manipulated by different actors
and regimes. As such, consumers in EU Member States may enjoy
stronger legal protections than American consumers, reinforcing a
particular regional subjectivity. Alternatively, or at the same time, they
may be influenced by the framing of rights in the United States by law
and corporate power in the form of nonnegotiable terms (and perhaps by
the appealing persona of the comedian) to the extent these messages are
made salient. In an increasingly global, complex, and interconnected
market, examination and analysis of the dynamics of subjectivity, as
impacted by narratives within and surrounding contract terms, becomes
crucial to an understanding of the impact of laws on subjects' rights,
experiences, and values.
Both the European and American approaches to consumer contracts
necessarily posit a subjectivity of the consumer (and with it, implicitly,
of the seller), and no regime can be expected to map perfectly onto an
individual's experienced (or a necessarily diffuse corporate) subjectivity.
This discussion demonstrates just one aspect of the complex mutually
impacting and constituting dynamic among experienced and posited
130. See Terms of Use page, supra note 111. The privacy policy itself can be unilaterally
modified according to its terms, again in contravention of the Directive's approach of
rendering such unfair terms presumptively unenforceable. Id.
131. See The Directive, supra note 5, §§ (i)-(k) (enumerating, respectively, terms that
"irrevocably bind[] the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of
becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract"; that "enabl[el the seller or
supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason which is
specified in the contract"; and that "enabl[e] the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally
without a valid reason any characteristics of the product or service to be provided").
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subjectivities and the legal regime. This article seeks to highlight the
allocation of power inherent in the complex dynamic through which
legal and cultural narratives mold and also elide subjective experience,
sometimes simultaneously. For legal regimes to aspire to goals of
fairness, freedom, agency, and justice, questions must be asked about
the experienced meaning of these ideals, the dynamics of power, and the
impact on and of legal actors' subjectivities.
